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Abstract In his recent book, The Dimensions of Consequentialism, Martin
Peterson puts forward a new version of consequentialism that he dubs ‘multidi-
mensional consequentialism’. The defining thesis of the new theory is that there are
irreducible moral aspects that jointly determine the deontic status of an act. In
defending his particular version of multidimensional consequentialism, Peterson
advocates the thesis—he calls it DEGREE—that if two or more moral aspects clash,
the act under consideration is right to some non-extreme degree. This goes against
the orthodoxy according to which—Peterson calls this RESOLUTION—each act is
always either entirely right or entirely wrong. The argument against RESOLUTION
appeals to the existence of so-called deontic leaps: the idea is that endorsing
RESOLUTION would not give each relevant moral aspect its due in the final
analysis. Our paper argues that, contrary to Peterson, (1) all moral aspects remain
visible in what can properly be called the final analysis of a moral theory that
involves RESOLUTION, (2) moral aspects do not have to remain visible in
judgements of all-things-considered rightness or wrongness, respectively, (3)
introduction of what Peterson calls verdictive reasons does not change the overall
picture in favour of DEGREE. We conclude that multi-dimensional consequen-
tialists should accept RESOLUTION rather than DEGREE.
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1 Multi-dimensional consequentialism
Consequentialism, at the most general level, is the view that normative properties
depend only on consequences. This general approach can be applied at different
levels to different normative properties of different kinds of things, but the most
prominent example is consequentialism about the moral rightness of acts. This
version of consequentialism holds that whether an act is morally right depends only
on the consequences of that act or of something related to that act, such as the
motive behind the act or a general rule requiring acts of the same kind, as judged
from an impersonal perspective. Setting now aside the often subtle differences
between versions of the doctrine, consequentialists traditionally also hold that
rightness is a binary property: an act is either fully right or fully wrong; there is no
intermediate stage. In this, they unite with other mainstream moral theories such as
Kantian deontology and virtue ethics.
In his new book, The Dimensions of Consequentialism, Martin Peterson probes
this unshaken assumption of our moral thinking. He does so by putting forward a
new version of consequentialism that he dubs ‘multi-dimensional consequentialism’
(MDC).1 To work out his theory, Peterson rethinks the structure of consequentialism
in particular and of the deontic in general, questioning many well-established views
and putting forward radical alternatives. He develops a version of MDC that he
claims to be superior to other consequentialist theories in significant respects, to wit,
to be intuitively more appealing and to avoid many of the influential objections to
consequentialism (such as the separateness-of-persons objection by Rawls (1971)
and the demandingness objection by Williams (1973)). These supposed advantages
and radical departures from established thinking no doubt make interest in MDC
warranted, singling out Peterson’s theory as an important target of discussion for
anyone with an interest in moral theorizing.
In this paper, we argue against the most salient and most revisionary claim of
Peterson’s version of MDC, while we remain silent on some less important
assumptions. The best place to start our investigation is Peterson’s account of MDC.
He defines consequentialism as the view that ‘‘the deontic status of an act depends
only on consequences’’ (1). He dubs this principle C*. The principle is crucially
vague though: we need to name the moral aspects—Peterson calls them C*
aspects—that can affect the moral rightness or wrongness—the deontic status—of
an act. Once these aspects are on the table—Peterson will later name well-being,
equality and risk, in particular—we can distinguish MDC from its one-dimensional
counterpart. The idea is that the latter holds ‘‘that an act’s deontic status can be
characterised by a one-place function of some C*-aspect’’, whereas the former
denies this: on MDC the deontic status of an act ‘‘can only be characterised by a
function of several C*-aspects.’’ (3f.)2
1 From now on, unless otherwise stated, all page references in brackets will be to this book.
2 The clause ‘can be characterized’ in the definition of one-dimensional consequentialism is important
because it makes the set of one-dimensional theories less restricted. For all it requires is that we find a
moral aspect that makes it possible to characterize an act’s deontic status as a function of that one aspect;
this does not rule out that another characterization exists that employs several moral aspects.
712 V. Andric´, A. Tanyi
123
Author's personal copy
Peterson’s next move is to hold that the moral aspects that determine deontic
status must be irreducible. This is in fact the defining thesis of MDC and follows
from the account given above. Peterson labels the thesis C1. One-dimensional
consequentialists, among them all utilitarians, egalitarians, and prioritarians (the
three major versions of this brand of consequentialism, according to Peterson), must
reject C1; multi-dimensional consequentialists must endorse it.3 However, Peterson
goes on to claim that ‘‘in order to formulate a normatively plausible multi-
dimensional theory, which fits well with our considered intuitions, two further non-
definitional claims need to be added. Both these claims raise substantial moral
issues and are logically independent of C1’’ (8).
The first additional claim is C2: ‘‘The binary relation ‘at least as good
consequences as’ is not a complete ordering’’ (8). The idea behind this thesis is that
different moral aspects are either incomparable or on a par—‘‘that it is impossible to
establish a precise exchange rate between all relevant aspects’’4 (9). How
widespread this phenomenon is, i.e., whether all or most or only some moral
aspects come under the scope of C2, is, however, left unclear by Peterson.
The last defining thesis of Peterson’s version of MDC is given by C3: ‘‘Moral
rightness and wrongness are non-binary entities, meaning that moral rightness and
wrongness vary in degrees’’ (9). Peterson’s idea is simple: not all acts are either
entirely right or wrong; some acts fall between these extremes, being in part right and
in part wrong. His intuitive example is a case where you can bring about either a world
in which Alice gets 100 units of well-being and Bob gets 50, or a world in which Alice
and Bob get 60 units each (2). The following table illustrates the situation:
The first option, Peterson says, is right with respect to well-being as it brings
about more well-being than the second. The other option is right with respect to
equality. All things considered, no option is entirely right or wrong since none of the
aspects trumps the other. To use the language of MDC, here we have two conflicting
and arguably incomparable moral aspects, well-being and equality, giving rise to a
deontic analysis that conforms to C3.
2 The argument from deontic leaps
Peterson is well aware that even from a consequentialist point of view MDC is a
deeply controversial theory. Each of its main building blocks (C1–C3) are hotly
contested, but the most radical among them, as again Peterson admits (23), is C3:
3 There is a complication, though, that deserves mention. ‘‘A dimension’’, Peterson explains, ‘‘can be
conceived of as the conceptual space in which an aspect can be altered.’’ (4) This means, as Peterson
subsequently admits, that a consequentialist theory that identifies several moral aspects as affecting the
deontic status of an act need not be multi-dimensional because all these aspects might belong to the same
dimension. However, for reasons of convenience and because his particular version identifies moral
aspects that belong to different dimensions, Peterson keeps the label ‘multi-dimensional’ throughout the
book and we will follow him on this.
4 Peterson defines incomparability as the claim that ‘‘for some consequences, no pair-wise evaluative
comparisons can be made’’. As for the other notion, his definition is that ‘‘two elements are on a par if and
only if they are comparable, although it is false that one is at least as good as the other’’ (9).
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the idea that rightness and wrongness come in degrees. In a sense, he has a simple
argument to support C3: that it, just like the rest of MDC in his view, tallies ‘‘better
with our considered moral intuitions than traditional, one-dimensional versions of
consequentialism’’ (14). The example given at the end of the previous section is
designed to illustrate this point. Yet, recall our introductory remarks, this is not
obviously convincing when contrasted with our general thinking about morality. In
any case, this can hardly be enough to support an entire theory and in fact Peterson
puts forward a master argument in support of C3: the argument from deontic leaps.
To get a clear grasp of Peterson’s argument, let us first introduce the competing
positions with regard to the truth or falsity of C3. The question to answer is the
following: If two or more irreducible moral aspects clash (because they are
incomparable or on a par), is the act under consideration right to some non-extreme
degree? That is, assuming that we accept C1 and C2, do we also have to endorse
C3? Peterson discusses three possible answers5:
In the RESOLUTION view, some available acts are right and all other acts are
wrong, because there always exists a single, underlying, all-things-considered
right-making feature that holds to the highest degree. In the DILEMMA view,
clashes between incompatible aspects entail that all available acts are wrong in
the binary sense, because there exists two or more all-things-considered right-
making features that hold to the highest degree. My hypothesis is, however,
that by rejecting the standard view we make room for a third position,
according to which all-things-considered deontic verdicts are, in many cases,
only partial (i.e., hold to a limited degree). This position, DEGREE, will be the
main focus of this chapter. It can be conceived of as an explication of claim C3
stated in Chapter 1. (26)
In this paper we will not discuss DILEMMA, but will focus on the debate between
RESOLUTION and DEGREE. However, Peterson’s definition of RESOLUTION is
problematic and this needs to be fixed before we can move on.
The definition uses the clause ‘‘a single, underlying, all-things-considered right-
making feature that holds to the highest degree’’, but this surely cannot be correct. If
this was so, RESOLUTION would be committed to comparability and thus deny
C2. In fact, from Peterson’s own discussion it is clear that RESOLUTION is
primarily the view that conflicts of different moral aspects can always be resolved
into a binary all-things-considered moral verdict. For this to happen, there is no need
to postulate the existence of a ‘‘single, underlying, all-things-considered right-
making feature’’. All that is needed is to establish the relevant moral aspects for
each available alternative act in the given situation, check how acts score with
respect to the different aspects and then use the scores across acts to arrive at a
binary verdict. In fact, Peterson not only points out that C3 does not follow from C2
by logical implication, he also considers two approaches that endorse C2 while
rejecting C3. Here is the one he claims to be better: ‘‘An act is morally right if and
5 As Peterson points out, these are pair-wise incompatible positions, but are not jointly exhaustive. Just
like him, however, we will rest content with these three positions in what follows.
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only if there is no alternative act that is better vis-a`-vis the majority of aspects, and
all acts that are not right are wrong’’ (12). Although Peterson rejects this idea (as
well as the other), this is not our concern now. Our point is only that this, or some
other similar approach, must be the way to go for advocates of RESOLUTION if
they want to also endorse C2 (as Peterson assumes) while denying C3. To sum up,
by ‘‘RESOLUTION’’, we henceforth mean the position that each act is entirely right
or entirely wrong and that, in each choice situation, there is at least one entirely right
act.
Once the competing positions are in place, we can turn to the argument itself. Recall
Well-Being versus Equality, illustrated in Table 1, in which you have to decide about
Alice’s and Bob’s well-being. A one-dimensional consequentialist who seeks to
maximize well-being is committed to the claim that maximally benefitting Alice is the
right choice and distributing well-being equally is the wrong choice; if he/she is an
egalitarian, then the conclusion is the reverse. According to the multi-dimensional
consequentialist, the first option is right to some degree as it maximizes well-being but
wrong to some degree as it produces more inequality. The other option produces more
equality but less well-being and is therefore also right to some degree and wrong to
some degree. In order to explicate and support the multi-dimensional consequential-
ist’s verdict, Peterson introduces the argument from deontic leaps (25):
The most important reason for taking the non-binary account of rightness and
wrongness seriously is an idea suggested by Nicolas Espinoza: unless we
concede that rightness and wrongness are non-binary properties, the multi-
dimensional consequentialist will sometimes face deontic leaps. A deontic leap
occurs if the deontic status assigned to an act does not reflect all relevant moral
aspects that obtain in the situation – the ‘leap’ arises as the moral theory
incorrectly ignores some moral aspect in its assignment of a deontic status to an
act. Consider again the case in which you face a choice between either
preserving a particular distribution of wellbeing or increasing the wellbeing
only for the best-off individual. No matter how you try to merge these two
conflicting aspects into a binary moral verdict, one of the two aspects – equality
or increased wellbeing for the individual – will not receive its due. A deontic
leap is bound to occur as you assign some binary deontic status to the available
act that does not reflect the two moral aspects that obtain in the situation.6
Table 1 Well-being versus
equality
Option 1 Option 2
Alice 100 60
Bob 50 60
6 Espinoza and Peterson (2012) also discuss deontic leaps in the medical ethics context, but we take it
that what appears in the book is the definitive statement of the argument from deontic leaps. Peterson
(2013: 24) actually introduces a case structurally similar to Well-Being versus Equality when putting
forward the argument from deontic leaps (this is the case he refers to in the quoted passage). However, for
ease of read and because nothing gets lost as a result of this move, we continue focusing on Well-Being
versus Equality.
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To make his case more convincing, Peterson brings in an analogy with football. In
football, he says, if one team beats another team by 3 to 1, ‘‘then the goal scored by
the defeated team made no difference to the final outcome. The team that scores
three goals won the match. The single goal scored by the defeated team was
completely outweighed and neutralised by the three goals scored by the winning
team’’ (28, our emphasis). But this, Peterson maintains, is not so in ethics where
‘‘there is actually a fundamental difference between winning by 3 to 1, and by 4 to
1. In ethics (but not in football) all goals scored by each team have to be fully
recognised in the final verdict, so to speak’’ (28).
The argument from deontic leaps can be summarized in two claims: (1) All moral
aspects have to be reflected (‘‘given their due’’) in the final analysis (Peterson’s
term), but (2) on RESOLUTION this is not possible because according to this
doctrine about the deontic one moral aspect is allowed to outweigh, annihilate,
neutralise or overshadow (these are the terms Peterson uses at different places to
characterize the phenomenon) another moral aspect. As we saw, this does not have
to imply a direct comparison of moral aspects (this would violate C2); it is enough if
we can use the different moral aspects across alternative acts to arrive at a binary
moral verdict. Nonetheless, Peterson will object that the result is that the situation in
which two or more moral aspects conflict is
ultimately resolved by selecting the option that satisfies only some of the
conflicting aspects. As a consequence, the agent will have committed an
unwarranted leap in her assignment of deontic status to the chosen option.
Having started with the assessment ‘A is right, with respect to those and those
aspects’, the agent ends up with ‘A is right’. This is unwarranted since,
clearly, A is in fact not fully justified, as some of the aspects that apply in the
situation in fact entail that it would have been right to do B rather than A. (30)
On DEGREE, we get a different sort of picture. All moral aspects will be reflected
in the final analysis because they will all be taken to contribute to the final calculation
of the degree of the rightness (and wrongness) of the given act. Take the three moral
aspects Peterson discusses in the book: well-being, equality, and risk. In Peterson’s
analysis each aspect, in different ways, will receive its own analysis that results in a
non-binary deontic verdict as to the degree of rightness (wrongness) of a given act
with respect to the particular moral aspect. Once this is done, an aggregation
mechanism is used to arrive at an all-things-considered non-binary moral verdict as
to the degree of rightness (wrongness) of a particular act concerning all relevant
moral aspects. The emerging view can be illustrated with Fig. 1:
What we label as Level I includes the identification of all the considerations,
typically called right-making features, that are channeled into verdicts as to the deontic
status of the act with respect to these considerations—well-being, equality, and risk,
respectively. The verdicts, pro tanto moral judgments, then appear on Level II in a
non-binary form (Degreeaspect).
7 Finally, the mentioned aggregation mechanism is
7 We prefer the term ‘pro tanto’ to ‘prima facie’ because the latter suggests that the consideration in
question is only apparent (as many have pointed about W. D. Ross’s use of the term, see e.g. Searle 1980
and Kagan 1989: 17n). Although in his discussion of Ross (27–29) he follows Ross in using the term
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used to factor the different level II judgments into one final, all-things-considered
judgment on Level III, once again in a non-binary form (DEGREE). As Peterson
admits (106), this last step requires a novel kind of aggregation method, the technical
details of which are discussed in an appendix of the book.
There are many questions to ask about DEGREE that we are not going to discuss
in detail. Thus, the exact nature of the aggregation mechanism is important and
arguably unresolved, partly because it is unclear how aggregation is possible at all
in light of C2. In this paper, however, we will critique other aspects of C3 and the
argument from deontic leaps. We will argue that, contrary to Peterson:
(1) All moral aspects remain visible in what can properly be called the final
analysis (Peterson does not define this term) of a moral theory that involves
RESOLUTION;
(2) Moral aspects do not have to remain visible in judgements of all-things-
considered rightness or wrongness, respectively;
(3) The introduction of what Peterson calls verdictive reasons does not change the
overall picture in favour of DEGREE.
Each point will be taken up in a separate section and the paper will end with a
short summary and some concluding remarks concerning the final fate of MDC.
3 The final analysis
As a starting point, notice that proponents of RESOLUTION can, and should, accept
the following pro tanto judgements with respect to Well-Being versus Equality
(Table 1):
Level I
Identification of right-
making features
Level II 
Pro tanto moral 
judgments
Level III
All-things-considered
moral judgment
DEGREE
Degreewell-
being
Binarywell-
being
Degreeequality
Binaryequality
Degreerisk
Binaryrisk
Fig. 1 DEGREE and the structure of deontic judgements
Footnote 7 continued
prima facie, we take it that Peterson has no preferred label for these qualified moral judgments and feel at
liberty to make a choice ourselves. We also assume that ‘pro tanto’ does not entail comparability.
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• Option 1 is right as far as well-being is concerned and wrong as far as equality is
concerned.
• Option 2 is wrong as far as well-being is concerned and right as far as equality is
concerned.
This is clearly not the point where Peterson’s analysis differs from RESOLUTION.8
The disagreement occurs when, as a next step, we ask about the account
RESOLUTION gives of all-things-considered judgments. What all-things-consid-
ered judgement are proponents of RESOLUTION committed to in Well-being
versus Equality? This depends on the balance of moral aspects across acts, and thus
on pro tanto rightness or wrongness, respectively. We submit that proponents of
RESOLUTION accept these claims:
• If one of the options is, on balance, more important than the other, then the former
option is all-things-considered right and the other all-things-considered wrong.
• If neither option is, on balance, more important than the other, then both options
are all-things-considered right.
At this point, however, an obvious reply suggests itself, which can, it seems, sink
RESOLUTION and which is based on the second building block of MDC—claim
C2. For, it seems that Peterson could just object that, given C2, no option is ever
more important than its alternative; hence no balancing (or weighing) of moral
aspects can take place, so RESOLUTION cannot even get off the ground and C3
must be true.
This objection, however, would puzzle us for three reasons. First of all, according
to the second claim we advise RESOLUTIONists to accept, all options are right if
neither option is more important than its alternatives because the options are
incomparable or on a par. Thus, RESOLUTION would have clear implications (and
in this sense ‘‘get off the ground’’) even if C2 implied that no option is ever more
important than its alternative. Although Peterson does not clarify how often moral
aspects are incomparable or on a par, in each such case the proponent of
RESOLUTION can have recourse to the second claim we advised him/her to accept
and maintain the rejection of C3.
Second, if C2 is intended by Peterson to defeat RESOLUTION and rule out binary
all-things-considered judgements in the first place, why does he offer the argument from
deontic leaps at all? In fact, Peterson clearly says, as we saw, that RESOLUTION,
DEGREE, and DILEMMA are the three positions he considers possible to take on the
assumption that C1 and C2 are accepted (23). If these claims are false, then the entire
chapter in which Peterson argues for C3 using the notion of deontic leaps is redundant
and hence all the burden to support C3 falls on his arguments for C2, which focuses only
on a small part of the existing literature (126–128, 162–164).9
8 Although Peterson explicitly endorses this claim (2), there is some ground for hesitation for he also
claims, as we saw in the previous section, that Level II judgments (which we take to be pro tanto moral
judgments) are also non-binary.
9 In particular, the so-called ‘small improvement argument’ by Chang (2002) that was designed to
support the idea that there is a third sui generis value-relation, namely, ‘on a par’. For an overview of the
debate, see Hsieh (2008).
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Finally, there is no reason to think that C2 rules out binary all-things-considered
judgements. One can endorse C2 as well as the whole of the above analysis since, as
Peterson himself points out (12) and we explained in detail in the previous section, C2
does not imply C3: it is possible to arrive at binary deontic judgments on the basis of
how alternative acts score with respect to the same bundle of moral aspects.
After this detour, let us return to the main line of our discussion. Once the two views
of RESOLUTION are on the table (its account of pro tanto and all-things-considered
moral judgments), an objection to the argument from deontic leaps suggests itself. It
has two parts, the first is negative, the second is positive. Our negative claim is that
Peterson seems to assume, but does not give a reason for thinking, that by ‘‘the final
analysis’’ of a moral theory we should just understand the all-things-considered
judgements it implies. Our positive claim is that the final analysis offered by a moral
theory is instead best understood as the conjunction of—at least—the all-things-
considered judgements and the pro tanto judgements concerning the deontic status of
an act (we will elaborate on this point below). If this is so, there is an important sense in
which all moral aspects remain visible in the final analysis, even if one endorses
RESOLUTION. To illustrate, take again Well-being versus Equality. Proponents of
RESOLUTION might hold the following final analysis with respect to the case:
• Option 1 is right as far as well-being is concerned and wrong as far as equality is
concerned.
• Option 2 is wrong as far as well-being is concerned and right as far as equality is
concerned.
• And: Either option is all-things-considered right.
As we pointed out, the last claim—either option is all-things-considered right—holds
even if the consequences of Options 1 and 2 are incomparable or on a par.10 There is a
further complication, though. One might wonder how we link the claim that both options
are all-things-considered right to a plausible account of decision making. For in his
chapter about multi-dimensional decision making, Peterson argues that a decision-
making procedure analogue to our criterion of rightness (that is: a decision-making
procedure according to which, if two objects are incomparable or on a par, the agent is
permitted to choose either of them), leads to certain losses because it sanctions non-
randomised choices when facing consequences that are not fully comparable (129–138).
Cannot an agent who accepts our final analysis be turned into a kind of money pump
because he/she is committed to the decision-making procedure criticized by Peterson?
We have a twofold response. Firstly, even if an agent who accepts our final
analysis could be turned into a money pump, this wouldn’t by itself speak against
our proposal. The money-pump argument arguably has its merits in discussions
about rational decision making. Here, however, we are talking about moral
rightness, not about rationality. This is a crucial difference that Peterson himself
often emphasizes. Why should money-pump arguments be relevant when it comes
10 In fact, as we mentioned above, Peterson himself concedes that an advocate of RESOLUTION could
even endorse a more committed analysis, namely: either Option 1 or Option 2 is all-things-considered
right and the other is all-things-considered wrong. These verdicts, however, would commit
RESOLUTIONists to the rejection of the second claim we suggested to them above.
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to assessing moral theories (as opposed to theories about rationality)? It is widely
accepted that moral rightness and rationality can come apart: what morality requires
might not be the rational thing to do, and vice versa. Applying criteria that are used
for the assessment of theories of rationality to moral theories therefore seems to be
problematic and in need of justification.
Secondly, the final analysis we suggest does not commit agents to decision-making
procedures of the kind criticized by Peterson. It is, rather, compatible with Peterson’s
preferred decision-making procedure.11 Thus, if Peterson is right that multi-
dimensional consequentialists should adopt his preferred decision-making procedure
and this procedure prevents you from being exploited as a money pump, then agents
who accept our final analysis should adopt Peterson’s preferred decision-making
procedure and, as a consequence, cannot be turned into money pumps.
Hence, we suggest that the final analysis of a moral theory contains, at least, the
pro tanto as well as the all-things-considered judgements; contrary to Peterson’s
suggestion that the final analysis is exhausted by all-things-considered judgments.
We have seen that our final analysis does not turn you into a money pump.
However, why should one accept our rather than Peterson’s proposal? Aren’t only
the all-things-considered judgements of moral theories important at the end of the
day, so that Peterson’s understanding of ‘‘final analysis’’ is more adequate?
We agree that ‘‘the final analysis’’ should refer to a moral theory’s most
important judgements. However, we would like to point out that which moral
judgements are important depends on what we are looking for:
(1) If we are looking for action-guidance (if we ask, ‘‘How ought we to decide?’’,
that is), only all-things-considered judgements are important.
(2) If we want to deliberate about what we ought to do all things considered or if
we already know the all-things-considered judgements and are looking for an
explanation of them, then only the pro tanto judgements are important.
(3) If we are asking for an exhaustive description of what is going on in a
situation, from a moral point of view, then both all-things-considered and pro
tanto judgements are important.
It seems most appropriate to call the exhaustive description (3) a moral theory’s
final analysis. For it contains both the action-guiding all-things-considered
judgements (1) and the explanatory pro tanto judgements (2) and will thus inform
us about whatever judgements implied by the moral theory are relevant to us.12
11 According to the decision-making procedure Peterson proposes for MDC, it is rational to choose each
option with a probability that is directly proportional to its moral force (119). An option’s moral force is
the sum total of all the products of degree and strength corresponding to each aspect (118). Obviously,
then, since the data you feed into Peterson’s decision-making procedure do not stem from the all-things-
considered but from the pro-tanto level, and since DEGREE and RESOLUTION do not contradict each
other on the pro-tanto level, you do not need to accept DEGREE in order to apply Peterson’s decision-
making procedure; you can apply it on our favoured version of RESOLUTION, too.
12 It can be argued that an exhaustive description also has to mention other moral facts: evaluative facts,
the explanatory relations between pro tanto and all-things-considered judgements, etc. But this isn’t a
problem for us to admit, as we only want to show that the final analysis, contrary to Peterson, does not
only include all-things-considered but at least also pro tanto judgments.
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We conclude that Peterson is wrong in claiming that on RESOLUTION certain
moral aspects will be lost in the final analysis of moral theories. Proponents of
RESOLUTION can have their cake and eat it, too: they can adopt both binary all-
things-considered judgements and nonetheless keep all moral aspects visible in their
final analysis. The bottom line is that our claim (1) is true.
4 All-things-considered judgments
However, accepting the claim that the final analysis of a moral theory is best
understood as an exhaustive account that includes both all-things-considered and
pro tanto moral judgments does not put an end to critical questioning. For, Peterson
could ask: ‘‘What about the deontic leaps within the all-things-considered
judgements: Isn’t it worrisome if, say, an option’s being wrong in one respect
doesn’t figure in the judgement that the option is all-things-considered right?’’
Whether or not we are right about what the final analysis of a moral theory looks
like, Peterson can point out, this is the real issue that the argument from deontic
leaps is designed to call attention to.
We disagree. First of all, there is no general requirement that each deontic
property of an act has to reflect all the other deontic properties of the act. Therefore,
it looks sensible to hold that an act’s all-things-considered rightness does not have to
reflect the act’s wrongness as far as a certain aspect is concerned, just like an act’s
rightness with respect to equality does not have to reflect the act’s wrongness with
respect to well-being and vice versa. Similarly, an act’s being the prudent thing to
do does not have to reflect its being immoral. In short, the question is why we should
single out the property of an act’s being all-things-considered right as somehow
special and different from all other moral (as well as non-moral) properties of acts.
Appeal to deontic leaps cannot be the answer because this just is the claim that such
a special status should be granted. Our question is: why?
One could answer that the relationship between all-things-considered and pro
tanto rightness is special because the former kind of rightness is uncontroversially
based, in some way or other, on the latter, whereas rightness with respect to equality
and rightness with respect to well-being are independent from each other, just like
an act’s being the prudent thing to do is not based on its being immoral. This answer
is unconvincing, however, for it is not true in general that if property P is based on
property Q, then P has to reflect Q; and there is no reason for thinking that deontic
properties are special in this regard. To illustrate with Peterson’s own example,
assume that a football team’s winning a match is based on its beating the other team
by 3:1. As the team’s winning the match is a binary property, it does not reflect the
team’s beating the other team by 3:1.
Another possible answer to our question takes us back to incomparability. At an
early point in the book, Peterson says that what he takes to be the best argument for
accepting C3, given that one accepts the ‘‘multi-dimensional picture’’ he describes, is
‘‘that this principle accurately reflects the insight that the ordering of consequences is
incomplete. If consequences determine deontic properties, and there are ‘gaps’ in the
ordering of consequences, then these gaps should presumably occur all the way up to
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the ultimate deontic level.’’ (12) Peterson’s idea here seems to be that to argue for C3,
one needs both incomparability (C2) and the notion of deontic leaps: it is the former
that creates the ‘gaps’ that, as the latter claims, need to be reflected in the final
deontic verdict. This combination of claims would answer our previous question (in
section II) why Peterson needs the argument from deontic leaps if he already has C2
in place. And it would also answer our question above by pointing to incomparability
as the missing link in granting special status to all-things-considered moral rightness.
We have a three-fold response. First of all, although C2 implies that there are
evaluative gaps in the assessment of consequences and consequentialist moral
theories can map these evaluative gaps onto their deontic assessments of actions, we
have still not been shown that consequentialist theories should map them. In
particular, an argument is required to make the move from the evaluative (gaps) to
the deontic (degrees). And again, the deontic leap argument cannot be this argument
because it states simply that such a move must take place without itself being an
argument for it. It is true that Peterson’s discusses and argues for incomparability
(although the arguments, as we noted, are relatively meagre, focusing on only a
small part of the debate), but only for incomparability as such and not for moving
from the evaluative to the deontic. Hence from his arguments it does not follow that
any such move must be made.
Second, a question about the legitimacy of focusing solely on all-things-
considered moral verdicts still looms large: If, on RESOLUTION, the gaps
mentioned by Peterson are represented in the form of pro tanto judgments in the
final analysis, why is this not enough? Why must these gaps also be reflected in the
all-things-considered judgments?
Finally, there is the question whether Peterson is right in his claim that the only
way to represent the relevant gaps in all-things-considered judgments is by
endorsing DEGREE. It seems to us that Peterson’s point turns on whether he is right
that RESOLUTION is committed to a picture on which moral aspects get, to use his
terms, outweighed, annihilated, neutralised or overshadowed by other moral
aspects. These terms characterize importantly different phenomena. In particular,
outweighing and overshadowing contrast with annihilating and neutralising: When
aspects conflict, the former phenomenon leave the aspect in place as something that
stays around, although outweighed; whereas the latter tells us that the given aspect
is not relevant, that it should not be considered at all (cf. Scanlon 1998 and Tanyi
2013). That is, the first type of phenomenon does not imply that a moral aspect is
non-existent (irrelevant) just because it lost out in a conflict with another moral
aspect(s). A moral aspect is thus reflected in two ways on RESOLUTION (since we
can reasonably assume that this approach requires no more than the first
phenomenon): It appears in the process that leads to an all-things-considered
judgment, namely, weighing, and it does not disappear as irrelevant even if it looses
out, but stays around waiting for its call. Add to this the fact that, as we showed,
RESOLUTION does not require any direct weighing of moral aspects and certainly
no annihilation or neutralisation of aspects, and it becomes questionable if Peterson
is right that the gaps created by incomparability are not reflected at all on
RESOLUTION. Is anything more theoretically demanding needed in order to reflect
the presence of moral aspects?
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If there is no good answer to our question, how about offering a simpler argument
in favour of non-binary all-things-considered judgments? Here is one. Since we
have accepted that pro tanto judgments are non-binary and all-things-considered
judgments are reached at via some method of aggregation from pro tanto
judgments, it appears reasonable to hold that all-things-considered judgments are
also non-binary. There are two problems with this proposal. One is that, although we
haven’t questioned this (since there was no need to) at the point when we introduced
the idea, it is far from clear why pro tanto judgments would be non-binary. What
would make these judgements non-binary, given that they are arrived at on the basis
of binary judgments about the right-making features of acts? Deontic leaps certainly
wouldn’t, since here we have no conflicting moral aspects that would have to be
reflected in the pro tanto judgment. Nor could the present proposal be reapplied
since judgments about right-making features are binary. More importantly, Peterson
wants to say that all-things-considered judgments are non-binary also in those cases
when pro tanto judgments from which they are generated are themselves binary—
Well-being versus Equality is an example at hand. The crucial point is not that the
present proposal would therefore make the scope of DEGREE significantly
restricted (although this too is a problem), but that it would contradict the very spirit
of Peterson’s thinking about why C3 is true (as encapsulated in the argument from
deontic leaps): that non-binary judgments are needed to reflect the conflict of moral
aspects as they appear in Level II pro tanto judgments.
What has been said so far is negative; here is a positive point against the idea that
all-things-considered judgments must be non-binary. Since the purpose of all-
things-considered judgements suggests that at least one option is entirely all-things-
considered right in each choice situation, an option’s being wrong in one respect
should not figure in all-things-considered rightness in cases when different moral
aspects clash. To substantiate: One purpose of (deontic) all things-considered
judgments is the provision of action-guidance. However, all-things-considered
judgements are not action-guiding in a satisfactory way if they do not single out at
least one action as the thing to do. (Imagine the following conversation: ‘‘What
should I do?’’—‘‘Well, there is nothing it would be entirely right for you to do. To
some extent…’’—‘‘What?!’’)13
Another purpose of all-things-considered wrongness judgments is assigning
blameworthiness. Arguably, the performance of wrong acts without excuses makes
people blameworthy. However, if there were choice situations with no entirely right
acts, then agents would become blameworthy irrespectively of what they did, for
every act in such situations would be somewhat wrong and in some such situations
there would be no excuses. The possibility of unavoidable blameworthiness, we
submit, is not plausible.14
Two objections have to be considered at this point. To our first claim concerning
action-guidingness, Peterson could reply that on his theory the thing to do is the
13 Note that the action-guiding function also explains why RESOLUTION is preferable to DILEMMA.
14 Intuitively, it would be unfair if you became blameworthy whatever you did. Morality would seem to
be incoherent.
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action that is most right in the given circumstances. However, first, is this really in
line with how we ordinarily see the connections between rightness and obligation?
Doesn’t morality demand only what is entirely right? How do demands relate to
degrees?
Second, if the thing to do on MDC is the act that is most right in the given
situation, it is far from clear that Peterson can indeed disarm the demandingness
objection: the charge that given the world as it is, consequentialism requires us to do
things that we, intuitively, find excessively demanding—say, to donate a large part
of our income to famine relief (Peterson’s example). Peterson claims that MDC has
the resources to defuse the objection because it can hold that donating is both right
and wrong at the same time (47–48).15 However, if the thing to do is the act with the
highest deontic score (‘most right’), it is well possible that, given the world as it is,
consequentialism will still come out as excessively demanding.16 In other words, it
is not enough if Peterson can show that excessive donation on MDC is not entirely
right; he must also show that the ranking of alternative acts is such that excessive
donation does not come out on top.
Turn now to the second objection that targets our second point concerning assigning
blameworthiness. Peterson could in response point out that if there is no entirely right
act in the given situation, then precisely this is an excuse. However, this also sounds
strange. It would mean that in a given situation where there is no entirely right act,
every act that is also to some degree wrong is nonetheless excused just because it is not
entirely right. This is surely a too easy way to avoid blameworthiness!
We thus conclude that, contrary to what Peterson claims, not every moral aspect
has to figure in all-things-considered moral judgments in the way DEGREE
requires. Even if this qualifies as a deontic leap, it is not a problematic one. Hence
our claim (2) is true.
5 Verdictive reasons
So far, our treatment of the argument from deontic leaps did not take into account
the distinction between evidential and verdictive reasons. Peterson thinks that the
distinction is important in that it lends significant support to his thesis about deontic
15 The idea, as Peterson later explains (70), is that those who donate excessively damage their own as
well as their loved ones’ well-being. Since, according to Peterson, persons’ well-being count separately
(‘persons’ is a separate moral aspect that Peterson uses to answer the separateness of persons charge), this
influences the calculation of all-things-considered rightness by making excessive donations less right and
more wrong.
16 Peterson could try to get around this problem by holding that the thing to do is not what is most right to
do in the given situation but what is sufficiently right to do. Besides that this raises the question of where
we draw the line (what is sufficiently right?), we also end up with the mirror of the debate about
satisficing consequentialism. Another possible way-out for Peterson would be to adopt agent-relative
theories of value—or maybe a person-relative dimension of value. Again, this would leave us with the
mirror version of an on-going debate. In general, arguments based on satisficing, agent-relative value,
etc., would be disappointing in the present context, for the hope was for MDC to escape the
demandingness objection in virtue of multi-dimensionality.
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degrees (C3) because it shows how certain moral considerations (evidential reasons)
can be disregarded in our final deontic verdicts, whereas others (verdictive reasons)
must always remain visible in our deontic analysis. If this was so, the argument from
deontic leaps would clearly follow since to say that certain moral considerations must
remain visible in the deontic analysis just is to state the argument from deontic leaps.
In ending our paper we must therefore bring the distinction and Peterson’s use of it
under close scrutiny. This requires that we understand what the distinction is about,
how it allegedly gives us the argument from deontic leaps, and what its problems are.
The distinction between the two kinds of reasons comes from Foot (1978: 182).
Peterson quotes Foot in introducing the distinction (29): ‘‘That a promise is being
broken, or a man killed or injured, is an evidential consideration; that something
immoral is being done is a verdictive consideration.’’ He then reformulates the
argument from deontic leaps using the distinction (29):
Now the deontic leap occurs in the transition from evidential to verdictive
considerations. Even though, initially, the agent correctly acknowledges all
relevant considerations while deliberating, some of which are verdictive and
some of which were merely evidential, the agent’s all-things-considered
conclusion will only respect some of these verdictive considerations. From a
moral point of view, this seems too heavy-handed. If you promise something
and then break the promise, it seems that the verdictive consideration that you
actually made a promise should – if we take traditional non-consequentialist
intuitions about promises seriously – remain visible in the final analysis.
The first thing to observe is that in the quote Peterson falsely interprets the distinction;
hence, as it stands, the distinction cannot give us the argument from deontic leaps.
‘That you actually made a promise’ is not a verdictive reason, but an evidential one: it
is therefore not a consideration that, by Peterson’s own lights, should be visible in the
final analysis. A verdictive reason, as the quote from Foot makes clear, would be a
consideration such as ‘that your breaking the promise was immoral’.
However, this understanding of a verdictive reason would again not give Peterson
the argument from deontic leaps since this is clearly an all-things-considered claim,
one that should be what reflects verdictive reasons and not be reflected itself—as a
verdictive reason would have to for the argument from deontic leaps to go through.
This is already clear in Foot’s original treatment since she talks about breaking a
promise being ‘immoral’ without any qualifiers, whereas it is certain that the kind of
verdictive reason Peterson needs is one that corresponds to qualified—we called
them: pro tanto—moral verdicts, where the qualification comes from the relevant
moral aspect. Stratton-Lake (1997: 753) whom Peterson also quotes in support of
the distinction makes this clear (this comes from the same passage that Peterson also
quotes at 29)17:
17 There is an underlying strand in Peterson’s discussion of verdictive reasons in which Stratton-Lake’s
article also appears that we do not discuss in this paper and to which the quote Peterson uses refers. It
concerns W. D. Ross’s distinction between prima facie duties and duties proper. Although it is an
interesting question how Ross’s theory relates to Peterson’s and whether Peterson’s treatment of Ross is
correct, dealing with these questions would bring unnecessary complications into this paper.
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A verdictive moral consideration is the conclusion of a piece of practical
reasoning about the deontological status of some act. It is an overall verdict
about whether some act is morally right, wrong or permissible. Evidential
considerations, on the other hand, are those which support, but do not
constitute overall moral verdicts.
To sum up, neither underlying right-making features such as ‘that you actually made
a promise’, nor overall moral verdicts such as ‘that breaking a promise is immoral’
can be the verdictive reasons that would give Peterson the argument from deontic
leaps. The only interpretation of verdictive reasons that can support the argument is
one that claims that verdictive reasons correspond to pro tanto moral claims, i.e.,
claims that are qualified according to a particular moral aspect. At certain points
Peterson is clear about this. Thus, he says (18, same point repeated at 30):
I argue that clashes between different moral aspects give rise to clashes
between conflicting verdictive reasons…Each aspect gives the agent a
verdictive reason to act in a certain way and the key question is, thus,
whether such conflicting verdictive reasons can always be resolved into a
single all-things-considered reason, such that all alternative acts are either
entirely right or entirely wrong, or whether there are cases in which acts come
out as neither entirely right nor entirely wrong.
That is, recall our schematic representation of DEGREE, evidential reasons are the
right-making features that figure in Level I judgments; verdictive reasons of the kind
Peterson needs are considerations that figure in Level II (pro tanto) judgments;
while verdictive reasons of the kind Foot and Stratton-Lake have in mind are those
that figure in Level III (all-things-considered) judgments. The conflict of evidential
reasons, under a given moral dimension, decides what verdict an act deserves with
respect to the given dimension; then the conflict of verdictive reasons, following the
argument from deontic leaps, decides about the overall deontic status of an act, i.e.,
about its degree of rightness/wrongness; finally, this overall deontic verdict gives
rise to an overall verdictive reason—whether we are morally required, prohibited,
permitted etc. to carry out the act in question—that can conflict with non-moral
reasons, should the situation arise. The result is the following modified schematic
representation of DEGREE, again using the three moral aspects—well-being,
equality, and risk—that Peterson discusses in the book (Fig. 2):
An advantage of this new presentation of DEGREE is that, piecing it together
with the schema we provided in Sect. 2 (Fig. 1: DEGREE and the structure of the
deontic), we can learn more about the overall structure of MDC. In particular, the
aggregation of Level II judgments (verdictive reasons) into Level III judgment
becomes somewhat clearer. Peterson gives the following clue: (30):
The fact that an act scores low with respect to a moral aspect is a verdictive
reason for not performing that act. If the act on the other hand scores high,
then that is a verdictive reason for performing it. Sometimes two or more
aspects give rise to a single verdictive reason for performing or not performing
an act, but sometimes each aspect produces separate verdictive reasons.
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That is, assuming that we have established the relevant deontic scores on Level II,
i.e., the degrees of rightness (wrongness) the act has with respect to the different
moral aspects, we can determine, in the way Peterson says in the quote, the presence
or absence of verdictive reasons generated by these aspects. And once we have these
reasons in place, we can follow Peterson’s further instructions as to how the
conflicting verdictive reasons give us the final deontic status of an act (33).18
There can be no doubt that the appeal to verdictive reasons, in the way specified
above, adds a further layer to Peterson’s already complex theory. And it is indeed a
further layer, as nothing in what Peterson says about moral aspects, incomparability
and irreducibility requires or implies the need for verdictive reasons (hence our
decision to give this topic a separate treatment), especially considering that not
everyone is keen on introducing reasons into moral theory. Be that as it may, the
real question for us is whether the introduction of verdictive reasons helps Peterson
to support the argument from deontic leaps.
We don’t think so. To begin with, our points in the previous two sections retain
their force. If we are right that the final analysis of a moral theory involves also the
pro tanto judgments (Sect. 3), then of course it also involves the verdictive reasons
these judgments are grounded in. Next, the introduction of verdictive reasons will
make no difference to our point that, given the two main purposes of all-things-
considered moral judgments, degrees of rightness and wrongness are not admissible
on that overall level of judgment (Sect. 4). Finally, there is the critical question we
raised and have attempted to answer concerning the special status of all-things-
considered moral verdicts and the properties they reflect (Sect. 4): why do they have
Level I
Evidential judgements
Level II 
Pro tanto moral 
judgments
Level III
All-things-considered
moral judgment
VERDICTIVE 
REASON
Verdictive
reasonwellbeing
Evidential
reasonswellbeing
Verdictive
reasonequality
Evidential 
reasonsequality
Verdictive
reasonrisk
Evidential
reasonsrisk
Fig. 2 DEGREE and the structure of moral reasons
18 Peterson discusses four basic cases: when an act is entirely right (there is a verdictive reason in favour
of and no verdictive reason against the act), when it is neutral (there is no verdictive reason either for or
against the act), entirely wrong (there is verdictive reason against the act, and no verdictive reason for it),
and to some non-extreme degree right (there is a verdictive reason both in favour and against the act). Of
course, several gaps still need to be filled in. In particular, the exact calculation of degrees still requires a
technically well worked out aggregation mechanism.
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to reflect deontic properties of acts when no other, moral or non-moral, properties of
acts have to do the same? This question now reappears with renewed force: what is
so special about verdictive reasons that would require them to be reflected, in the
way Peterson proposes, in final all-things-considered moral judgments?
In fact, the force of this question is not simply renewed but stronger. For it is not
obvious that verdictive reasons exist. Recall that both Foot and Stratton-Lake think
in terms of two kinds of reasons: evidential reasons that are provided by what the
given theory takes to be the right-making features of acts and verdictive reasons that
are, however, understood as final, all-things-considered moral considerations—that
is, not the sort of considerations that Peterson needs in order to get his argument off
the ground. At this point, though, Peterson could have an answer that is analogous to
the one we gave on his behalf in the previous section: a combined appeal to
incomparability and deontic leaps. There are different moral aspects, he could say,
and they are incomparable, creating ‘gaps’ in the ordering of consequences.
Verdictive reasons are provided by these aspects (this is something, recall the quote
above, he does in fact say) and the need to reflect the gaps in the ordering is what
gives us the argument from deontic leaps. We have taken issue with this sort of
answer in the previous section and what we say there also applies here (as far as we
can tell).19 But now there is a further challenge.
The challenge is simple: are there reasons which are not evidential? Jonathan
Dancy (2004: 16) clearly answers ‘no’:
The point that verdictive judgments do not contribute to the situations on
which they pass judgment is only one application of the more general truth
that thin concepts cannot be used to add to the store of reasons. That an action
is good, or right, is no reason to do it. It is the features that make the action
good or right that are the reasons for doing it, and to say that it is good or right
is merely to express judgment about the way in which other considerations go
to determine how we should act.
Now, of course, we do not have to accept what Dancy says just because he says it.
One opinion, however well-known it is, cannot decide the debate. However, the
point is that there is a debate: Dancy, for instance, spends an entire chapter on
arguing for his thesis. This, in the minimum, means that, whether or not Dancy’s
thesis appears sensible to one (and to us it does so appear), the only way to support
the argument from deontic leaps that in its present interpretation crucially requires
the existence of verdictive reasons, is by taking issue with Dancy’s (and others’)
19 Of the three responses we give there, the last might be less applicable insofar as Peterson repeatedly
denies that the weight of verdictive reasons would be what determines the degree to which an act is right;
it is instead the content of these reasons that does so (37–39). This claim is then supported by examples
that should trigger intuitions in favour of Peterson’s thesis (37, 93, 117). We are not so sure that the
examples indeed work in Peterson’s favour but, in absence of space, we let this go. What instead we
would like to point out is that, as we noted in our original response, it is not clear that RESOLUTION
would have to be committed to any direct weighing of verdictive reasons (since it accepts C2 that rules
out any such weighing).
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thesis. However, Peterson does no such thing and this leaves his argument from
deontic leaps without proper foundations.20
Therefore, we conclude that our claim (3) stands: the introduction of verdictive
reasons does not, as it stands, tilt the balance in favour of DEGREE.
6 Concluding remarks
We have argued for three points in this paper: (1) all moral aspects remain visible in
what can properly be called the final analysis of a moral theory that involves
RESOLUTION, (2) moral aspects do not have to remain visible in judgements of
all-things-considered rightness or wrongness, respectively, (3) the introduction of
what Peterson calls verdictive reasons does not change the overall picture in favour
of DEGREE. Since we have moreover seen, in Sect. 4, that the purposes of all-
things-considered judgements—the provision of action-guidance and the attribution
(or expression) of blameworthiness—suggest that at least one option is entirely all-
things-considered right in each choice situation, we have reason to conclude that
multi-dimensional consequentialists should accept RESOLUTION rather than
DEGREE.
Despite our criticisms, we find Peterson’s theory a fascinating new take on an old
view. In fact, even if we have managed to establish our three points, we have not
questioned two of the three building blocks of MDC: we have accepted that there
are irreducible moral aspects and that at least some of these aspects are
incomparable or on a par. Given that the first claim of irreducibility is the one
that, according to Peterson, makes consequentialist theory qualify as multi-
dimensional, this means that we have not refuted MDC per se. All we did was to
question the particular version of MDC that Peterson advocates.
This doesn’t mean, though, that we find the theory obviously true. In particular,
we have the nagging worry that anything can be built into MDC: if there is an
alleged problem with consequentialism, be that concerning equality, rights, duties,
virtues, or risk, Peterson can simply point out that this is a separate moral
dimension, or a separate aspect of a dimension, and the challenge these ideas pose to
consequentialism is over. Still, one cannot but wonder: is this really so easy? Take
Peterson’s discussion of the legitimacy of what is normally called, following
Scheffler (1994), agent-centred prerogatives. Peterson simply says that this is a
legitimate device, because ‘persons’ is a separate moral dimension in his theory
(69–70). Yet, one wonders if he can really get this result so cheap: over the past
decades several philosophers have struggled to find a rationale for such prerogatives
within consequentialism (cf. Kagan 1989) and now Peterson brings them in with one
simple move. Could this be so easy?
20 In fact, the situation is more peculiar since Peterson cites Dancy in support of the distinction between
evidential and verdictive reasons (29, fn. 10) and hence in support of the argument from deontic leaps.
This, as the quote in the text shows, is clearly a mistake.
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To be fair, at one point Peterson does give us his criterion for including a moral
aspect in MDC (which is pretty much what our worry boils down to).21 He says that
it should directly influence an act’s deontic status in the sense that ‘‘the deontic
status of an act varies if we hold constant everything but the putative aspect in
question’’ (15). But this definition appears to be question-begging, since the dispute
among moral theories is exactly what influences this deontic status. As a result, this
criterion cannot come from within moral theories, since then every one of them will
be self-justifying and hence uninteresting.22 It must come from outside these
theories, but what would that outside source be? We suppose that it would have to
be intuition. But surely, one thing we know about common-sense is that it is unclear
and often inconsistent about questions of this sort. In any case, is Peterson
suggesting that intuitions singling out widely different features of our moral life can
be pulled into one moral theory just by one master stroke? Before we embrace
MDC, even if without C3, we would like to hear a convincing answer to this
question.23
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